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Globalisation and China’s Military Modernisation: Fear
not China
Xiaoli Jiang, University of Ballarat, Victoria, Australia
Yihong Gong, Baiyun University, Guangdong, China
Abstract: China has one of the most powerful military forces in the world. However, a little over 100
years ago, the Chinese military was repeatedly defeated by Western colonial powers and Japan. These
defeats motivated the Chinese to make dramatic changes to their military forces. Based on an analysis
of contemporary Chinese history and cultural values, it would appear there have been four major at-
tempts to modernise the Chinese military. These attempts have been consistently driven by the need
to defend Chinese national interests and self-esteem. Although the current military’s rapid transform-
ation has alarmed the West, in reality China’s intentions are more about self-defence and nullifying
internal independence movements, in particular Taiwan, and has little to do with expansion of territory.
Keywords: Globalisation, China, Military, Modernisation
OCTOBER 1
st 2009 was the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. It
was marked by a military parade showcasing what the Chinese perceived as their
military modernisation. According to foreign commentators, themes of the military
parade included information warfare and the creation of a smaller, more professional
military force (Friedman. 2009). China is perceived as having one of the most powerful
military forces in the world (Fisher, 2008).
However, a little over 100 years ago, China’s military was repeatedly defeated by Western
colonial powers and Japan. Chinese today view that part of their history as a chapter in hu-
miliation and shame. These defeats were a major motivational factor for China’s numerous
attempts to modernize its military.
This paper identifies four attempts by the Chinese military to modernise its forces in a
world of globalisation. Through an historical account of struggles with international invasions
and threats to Chinese sovereignty the paper reveals the major motivations of the modernisa-
tion efforts. It also explores the cultural roots that underpin changes to the Chinese military
designed to meet the challenges of globalisation.
The Early Development of China’s Military in the Context of a Negative
Global Environment
Gunpowder was invented by the Chinese in the Jin Dynasty (1115–1234) and guns were
widely available to its military forces during the mid-fourteenth century. For example, guns
were placed along the Great Wall to enhance its defensive strength. China’s Admiral
Zhenghe’s seven voyages between 1405 and 1433 to South and Southeast Asia used fleets
armed with guns. At that time the Chinese possessed impressive oceangoing as well as river-
bound ships. However, due to government restrictions not to allow the knowledge of gun
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and gunpowder making outside of the military, there was a lack of progress in Chinese gun
technology in the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties. By mid 17th century
foreign firearms had become superior as did European naval vessels (Lorge, 2008).
By the late 18th and early 19th century, the Chinese military continued to fall further behind
Europe. The West’s experiences of European centered wars and the associated evolution of
modern weaponry, tactics and strategies compounded the Chinese military decline as did
the industrial revolution and rapid globalisation. At the same time, the combined effect of
the rebellions by the Miao, White Lotus and Eight Trigram weakened the Qing Dynasty
(Elleman, 2001). The Opium War, according to some Western views (Elleman, 2001) was
a trade war, and British traders won equal treatment through the war. However, the Chinese
version of this event was that it was bullied and invaded by the British, backed up by its
military power (Liu, 2007). Regardless of the interpretations of the war, the Qing military
was based on the traditional Banner system. When compared to Western military it was
weak. During the War, the most common weapons of the Qing soldier were swords, shields
and pikes. China’s naval defense force was small and confined to the Guangdong coast (Fay,
1975). Further, Chinese troops were underpaid and undereducated (Zarrow, 2005). Their
defeat resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Nanking. Under the Treaty Hong Kong was
ceded to Britain, five Chinese ports were opened to the British and a large amount of indem-
nity was paid to Britain. Further, land areas of 40,000 square miles between China and the
British colony, India, were drawn into the border of India (Hoffmann, 1990). Today Chinese
people believe one of the main reasons for the slow development of the Chinese military at
the time was due to an inward looking view of the world by the Qing Court and a lack of
desire to be integrated into a globalising world with its rapid technological development (Ni,
2008).
However, Guandong was over 2000 kms away from the administrative centre in Beijing.
The defeat in the first Opium War did not change the ways the Qing Court saw the world
and its practices. Following the first Opium War in 1840, China was defeated in the Arrow
War in 1860, commonly called the Second Opium War by the Chinese, by the Anglo-French
troops. The imperial Summer Palaces, architectural wonders of the world at the time were
looted and torched during the war. Treaties were signed with Britain and France to open
more ports and pay more indemnities. To many Chinese, it was heart-breaking to see the
ruins of the palaces. For the Qing Court, its wealth was fast depleting. This time the shock
of the defeat to the Chinese, especially within the Qing Court, was profound because the
invaders came to Beijing, the capital. The Chinese people’s sense of security was deeply
eroded.
As a result, in 1861, the Chinese government started the Self -Strengthening Movement.
The most important goal during the early phase of the movement was its first military mod-
ernisation. It set out to develop military industries, namely the construction of military arsenals
and of shipbuilding dockyards to strengthen the Chinese navy. The government also purchased
a large amount of military equipment including guns, cannons and warships from the West.
Fortresses were also built at important coastal ports, all imitating the Western approach to
defence (Tan, 2009). In 1870, China established its first modern naval force. By 1882 China
had 50 steam warships, half imported and half self built (Elleman, 2001). Foreigners were
employed to train the Chinese: significant progress was made. Given past foreign invasions
came from the sea, the first military modernisation was concentrated on strengthening the
navy aiming to defend China’s coastlines more effectively (Tan, 2009).
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The Second Modernisation of China’s Military Forces in Response to
Foreign Aggression
Between 1860 and 1911, the Qing court rapidly declined, aided by internal rebellions and
foreign invasions. Between 1871 and 1875 Russian invaded Xinjiang. It resulted in the
Chinese paying 9 million rubles as an indemnity (Elleman, 2001). This was followed by the
Sino-French War in Annum (Vietnam) in 1884-85. During the war the French attacked
Fuzhou in Southeast China, sank most of China’s southern fleet and destroyed the Fuzhou
Navy Yard. China was forced to cede the tributary status of Annum to France and later on
Burma to Britain. This prompted Japan to make similarly aggressive moves to force China
to relinquish Korea’s tributary status in northeast China (Elleman, 2001).
In 1894-95 Japanese aggression sparked the Sino -Japanese war. The war ended with
China’s elite Beiyang naval fleet being completely destroyed. When Japan invaded Manchuria,
there was little resistance from the Chinese army. In 1895, the Treaty of Shimonoseki
awarded Taiwan, Penghu Islands and Liaodong Peninsular to Japan, together with 200 million
ounce of silver as indemnity as well as fulfilling other numerous demands, including the
loss of Korea as a Chinese tributary. The war also made clear to foreigners that the occupation
of substantial parts of China was possible. Germany, Russia and Great Britain quickly de-
manded territorial concessions of their own. Russia annexed 154 million square kilometers
of Chinese land, equivalent to 1/5 of the Australian landmass. These areas have never been
returned to China (Xue & Luan, 2006) and have caused deep resentment for generations of
Chinese. The later conflicts on the borders between China and the Soviet Union had much
to do with this part of their history.
The defeat by Japan awakened Chinese out of their four thousand years of relative isolation.
The Chinese emperor Guanxu developed an ambitious reform plan, aiming to transform the
Chinese political landscape, education, economic system and military forces. Although the
reform only lasted 103 days the impact on the Chinese military force lived on. The Qing
Court this time concentrated the modernisation more on the army because of the land based
foreign invasions, especially by the Japanese (Ni, 2008). A “New Army” was created. There
was a 10 year plan to create 36 divisions with total troops numbering half a million. The
reform also sought to build infrastructure to produce China’s own arsenals. By 1910 China
was producing mountain guns, ammunition, rifles and machines guns. Rebuilding of the
navy was also implemented with soldiers sent to England for training (Fung, 1980)
By the turn of the 20th century, anti foreign sentiment in China had grown dramatically
due to the humiliating treaties and loss of large parcels of land areas. In 1900 the Boxers
rebelled against the foreigners. Although it was put down by the collective efforts of eight
nations – United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Japan, Russia, United States
and Austria-Hungary - over $333 million in indemnities and other compensations were paid
to these countries, the anger of Chinese people toward foreign power dominance and bullying
has never ceased to exist. Generations of young educated Chinese have vowed to respond
to this humiliating chapter via building a strong China. This part of Chinese history is taught
in all primary and secondary schools as well as universities throughout the modern era of
China, currently as a compulsory subject (Liu, 2007). It has become an important motivation
for creating a powerful military force. Further, the Boxers’ faith in magic and martial arts,
their belief that they were bullet proof proved to be no match for Western military technology
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and strategies. Thus this led to an on-going twentieth century trend of modernizing China’s
military forces along Western lines. (Elleman, 2001)
In the 1920’s there was continued occupation and control in Northern China by the Soviet
Union and Japan. In 1929 the Chinese Nationalist army was defeated by the Soviet Union
when trying to regain control over the Chinese Eastern Railway (Elleman, 2001). In 1931
Japan gained control over Manchuria and in 1937 started an eight year war and occupation
of China, concluding with the Japanese defeat by the allies in 1945. The wars cost China
dearly in human lives and wealth. It is estimated by the Chinese that approximately 35 million
people were killed or wounded during the war. Property losses and the expenses of the war
were estimated at US$100 billion (Wu, 2005). Chinese people largely blame the weakness
of their military for the enduring conflicts and tremendous suffering of the nation.
The Third Modernisation of China’s Military in the Face of International
Threats
After the communist took over China in 1949, the first war China engaged in was the Korean
War between 1950 and 1953. In June 1950, North Korea invaded the South. American led
UN forces came to the South’s rescue. In October, UN troops occupied the capital of North
Korea, Pyongyang, and continued to push northward towards the Yalu River that separates
China and Korea. Communist China was barely one year old and did not want to engage in
another war. However, the American led UN troops were too threatening to be ignored.
China launched a surprise attack with the 260,000 Chinese People’s Volunteers crossing the
border on the 19th October 1950 (Ni, 2008). Although the Chinese troops successfully pushed
the UN and South Korean troops back to the 38th parallel, they suffered very heavy casualties
- between 450,000 and 1 million men, including Mao’s son in the three year Korean War
(Spence, 1990; Spurr, 1988). This led to the third major military reform in modern Chinese
history.
Mao’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) successfully created a mobile army, investing
heavily in artillery, tanks and advanced Soviet Union aircraft. These reforms continued
throughout the 1950’s. China had sought support from the Soviet Union from the beginning
of the new 1949 government and was provided with $300 million in credits and thousands
of military and industry advisors in this period (Elleman, 2001).
The size of the PLA was reduced from 5 million to 2.5 million, but equipped with modern
rifles, mortars and artillery. Structurally, the original six military bureaus were divided into
thirteen regional commands. Modern military academies were opened to train a new gener-
ation of officers on how to use Western tactics to conduct modern warfare (Ni, 2008).
The military budget was also increased significantly from 2.8 billion in 1950 to 5.5 billion
in 1957, averaging between 20 to 40% of the entire government budget (Spence, 1990). In
the early 1960s China was able to produce its own MiG – 17s, MiG-19s as well as T-54
tanks and naval patrol boats (Joffe, 1987). The third military modernisation was a clear
success and had an enormous impact on the effectiveness of the PLA.
This modernisation provided China with the upper hand in the 1962 Sino-Indian Border
War. In the context of India’s granting sanctuary to the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai
Lama in 1959, there had been small border clashes and later on escalated into a full scale
border war. The disputed areas were around 40,000 square miles. The border boundary lines
had been drawn in 1842 and 1914. China claimed these boundaries were the result of unequal
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treaties during the British imperial era (Hoffmann, 1990). China had been forced to sign the
treaties under military defeat and coercion to settle the borders which ceded the land to India,
at the time a British colony. China believed it deserved to regain the land that belonged to
them. However, India and the Western world thought that the borders were settled in 1914
and China was on a military expansion mission (Patel, 1963). This war ended with India’s
defeat.
In 1959 China’s relationship with Soviet Union went sour. China had to repay all the aid
provided by the Soviet Union. Russian advisors, engineers, technical staff, teachers and
professors who were in China to help build Chinese industry, including military production,
were all withdrawn. China had to become self reliant in order to continue the modernisation
of its military. In June 1964, after nearly 10 years of research, China successfully tested its
first nuclear bomb and joined the world nuclear club (Ni, 2008). The Chinese people were
extremely excited and proud of this achievement. Importantly, in light of the unfriendly re-
lationship with the Soviet Union and enemy status designated to the American allies, the
bomb gave Chinese people a sense of security.
However, in 1966 Mao started the now infamous Cultural Revolution which lasted for 10
years. This Revolution brought the nation to a standstill in all aspects of life. Schools and
universities were closed for nearly three years, factories, especially military factories, stopped
production. Military goods were robbed or destroyed during some of the armed struggles.
China was engaging in a nationwide self-destruction. All communication with the outside
world ceased. Anyone who dared to do so would be sent to jail as a foreign spy. China was
completely isolated from global activities at a time when globalisation was gaining a new
momentum around the world. The outcomes of the 10 year Cultural Revolution were devast-
ating. A generation of Chinese lost their opportunities for education and decent employment
in urban areas. The Chinese economy fell into serious decline. People’s standard of living
was reduced to survival mode. Rations were applied for essential goods including grain,
cooking oil, meat, nuts and even soap. The modernisation of the Chinese military was halted
while the rest of the world was moving forward at a rapid pace.
The Fourth Modernisation of China’s Military in the Context of A
Booming Economy Whilst Retaining Internal Unification
The Cultural Revolution set China back at least 20 years through the destruction of people,
education, facilities and national infrastructure. In 1978, just after the Cultural Revolution,
Deng Xiaoping, then the paramount leader, emerged from the political wildness. He initiated
badly needed economic reforms and implemented an Open Door policy to reconnect China
with the rest of the world. Chinese leaders sensed the urgency to achieve the Four Modern-
isations that were announced in 1965 by the former Premier Zhou Enlai, a highly respected
Chinese leader. However, amongst the Four Modernisations the military modernisation was
the lowest priority as China had a pressing need to reform its economic system to save nation
from the brink of economic collapse.
Since 1978, China’s economic reforms have brought the country unexpected prosperity
via 30 years of consecutive GDP growth of more than 9% a year. China embraced globalisa-
tion by opening its markets to the world in return for trade exports and foreign investments
in China. The modernisation of agriculture, industry, science and technology has made re-
markable progress during this period. However, the modernisation of the Chinese military
199
XIAOLI JIANG, YIHONG GONG
was a lower priority given the need to create a strong economic foundation. In addition, a
relatively less hostile global political environment also reduced the urgency for military
modernisation. Relationships with the USA, Japan and the Western world were normalized
and even relations with the Soviet Union (now Russia) were much improved.
However, in early 1991, Chinese leaders were stunned by the shock and awe of the
American and its allies’ military power during the First Gulf War. The surgical bombing
and cruise missile attacks destroyed Iraqi air defences while electromagnetic warfare attacked
Iraqi command and control networks. The First Gulf War was a walkover by the West against
Iraq and revealed that Western warfare had made a quantum leap into a new era (Shambaugh,
2002). This war made the Chinese PLA and Communist Party leaders realise how far they
had been left behind. In the 1980s, the PLA was preparing for “people’s war under modern
conditions” initially, then for “limited war”. However, nothing prepared them for the shock
of modern warfare exhibited by US forces and its allies. In the context of rapid modernisation
of global warfare Beijing started a series of initiatives to truly modernize the Chinese military.
Military strategy was revised focusing on high technology warfare, enhanced quality and
effectiveness of the force (Shambaugh, 2002).
If the Gulf War opened the eyes of Chinese military leaders, then the ‘Taiwan Crisis’ of
1995 struck at the heart of the nation. In that year, Li Denghui, the president of Taiwan, was
allowed to visit the USA. China was alarmed by the granting of a visa for the visit and con-
cerned about the support given by the Americans to Li who harbored pro-Taiwan independ-
ence sentiments and was therefore a threat to stability of the region (Fisher, 2008). This was
understandable in the context of the humiliating history in which China lost considerable
parts of its land and tributary areas: China would strongly resist any more loss of its territory
regardless of the circumstances. Taiwan has always been considered part of China. Even the
Taiwanese government under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and his son had always had
the mission to regain the mainland, in other words unification, but under the Nationalist
leadership. China psychologically could not afford an independent Taiwan in the modern
world and deeply believes it would be a loss of sovereignty (Zhang, J. 2009). Should that
happen, it would be a repeat of the humiliating history. Too much national interest, in partic-
ular the nation’s self-esteem, would be at stake. In response, China conducted military exer-
cises initially in the mainland areas opposite Taiwan from July to November in 1995. In
March 1996, the PLA fired M-9 missiles into the Taiwan Strait within miles of several harbors
in Taiwan. America’s response to this aggression was to display its biggest military might
in Asia since the Vietnam War. President Clinton ordered ships including the USS Nimitz
into the Taiwan Strait, the first transit by a U.S. warship in the Taiwan Strait since 1976, a
clear signal by the U.S. that it was willing and ready to defend Taiwan in the face of PLA
military action (Ling, Hwang, & Chen, 2010).
The Taiwan Strait crisis identified the urgency for a rapid improvement in the Chinese
military. The leaders decided to accelerate its military modernisation. In 1996 Chinese
Premier Li Peng visited Moscow and ordered a Sovremenny Class Missile Destroyer. China
subsequently ordered modern attack submarines (Kilo Class) and warplanes (Su-30MKK2)
to counter the U.S. Navy’s CVBG (Gill, 2007). A new doctrine emerged, “fighting a limited
war under high-tech conditions”(Ji, 2004).
Since 1991 the PLA has undertaken many reforms. These include a reduction in the
overall military size to 2.3 million combatants, increasing education levels, professionalising
the force and developing smaller, more mobile units. Beijing has also placed emphasis on
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a Western style of military training. Special operation forces have been created in each of
China’s seven military regions (Blasko, 2006). The vision for China’s ground force is to
transform a continental military requiring a large ground force for in-depth defence to a
smaller, more flexible, highly trained and well-equipped ground force with rapid reaction
units (Crane, Cliff, Medeiros, Mulvenon, & Overholt, 2005).
With regard to military equipment, Sloan (2008) identified that China continued to produce
battle tanks such as the new T99, medium weight armored vehicles similar to America’s
Stryker, amphibious tank landing ships and so on. China is also developing self-propelled
artillery and howitzers and precision guided artillery such as the A-100 and WS-2 multiple
rocket launcher. China has developed fighter aircraft for more precision in air strike capab-
ility and possesses precision short-range ballistic missiles and a medium range (approximately
2,500 kilometers) ballistic missile – the Don Fang 21. Satellite guided technology has been
used. In 2006 a concept for a supersonic, unmanned stealth combat aerial vehicle with primary
air-to-air mission was unveiled (Sloan, 2008).
However, China’s technology in military equipment production is limited. To compensate
for this, in 2001 China signed a twenty year treaty with Russia for “friendship and coopera-
tion” and imports a large mount Russian-built military devices such as Mi-17 troop lift
helicopters, heavy transporters, air-cushion landing crafts, Kilo-class diesel electric submarines
and Sovremenny II-class guided missile destroyers (Sloan, 2008). Since the beginning of
the 1990’s it is estimated that Moscow’s defence sales to China averaged $1 billion a year,
increasing to $2 billion a year from 1999. It is thought that China’s main objective is to obtain
a license and technology transfer for domestic production. However, Russia’s assistance to
China is restricted to defensive capabilities and exempts advanced technology (Rangsimaporn,
2006).
With the modernisation activities, China’s military spending has been increased signific-
antly. According to Fisher (2008), between 2001 and 2007 China’s defence budget increased
258 percent. During the same period US military spending went up 83 percent. The fast
growth in Chinese military expenditure has become a concern to many in the West. However,
if the spending increase is put into perspective, it may not be that alarming. It is common
knowledge that China started from a much lower base. Even with the highest US Defence
Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimate, China’s military spending in 2007 was between $85
billion and $125 billion. In contrast, the USA figure was $532 billion. It is believed that
China’s total military expenditures are less than that of the US Navy budget ($147 billion)
(Fravel, 2008).
China’s military modernisation has alarmed some policy-makers and academics in the
US and its Western allies, especially when a Chinese weather satellite was destroyed by a
PLA direct-ascent anti-satellite missile. The successful test was a shock to the world. The
much delayed acknowledgement of this event further added to the shock. As a result, China
has been perceived to have global ambitions (Fisher, 2008). However, according to several
research analysis of Chinese military modernisation, China’s ability to project conventional
military power beyond the Taiwan Strait and its periphery remains limited (Sloan, 2008;
Foot, 2006; Smith & Davies, 2010; Fravel, 2008). China has always maintained that its goal
is defence based on “peaceful development”, “non interference, no expansion” and “not
seeking a super power position” (Liu & Liu, 2009). The fact that China has only begun to
acquire forces for maritime denial and regional force projection (Fravel, 2008) is indicative
that its action is consistent with China’s public announcement of its military modernisation
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intensions. The modernisation of China’s air force over the past decade has focused on short-
range fighters, not long-range bombers. Similarly, the Chinese navy only possesses a modest
ability to replenish ships required for long-distance patrols and is without any overseas
naval bases (Fravel, 2008). Smith & Davies (2010) believe that China is decades away from
fielding a military to rival the US and it only has a modest capability to project military
power far from its shores. It would appear much of China’s military modernisation has been
prepared for a potential conflict in relation to Taiwan.
Making Sense of the Motivations for China’s Military Modernisation
Globalisation is viewed as a process to broaden and deepen interactions and interdependence
among societies throughout the world (Cohn, 2005). This process started from the early
world trade and economic interconnections, and thrived in the 16th century. The Western
invasion and colonization of much of Asia during the 18th and 19th centuries established a
new mechanism for global interconnection (Holton, 1998). China is one of the major civil-
isations of the world with 5000 years of history. For a large part of its civilisation history,
China has proudly claimed itself as a rich Middle Kingdom that led the world in many aspects
such as agriculture, medicine, culture, philosophy, early science and technology. However,
the globalisation force between 1840 and 1949 did not bring pride and dignity to the Chinese
people. The series of Western invasions and semi-colonization caused huge financial and
land losses and deep psychological scaring to the nation and its people. Humiliation and
shame to the Chinese people has been intense.
Chinese culture is based on Confucianism which advocates dignity and self-esteem. For
individuals, Confucius promoted the ‘perfect man’. For society he focused on the collective
good, social harmony, sacrifice and social hierarchy. There is a tendency for Chinese to seek
perfectionism and to conform. People are very conscious of self-esteem. The well known
‘face’ issue in China is a reflection of the importance of Chinese self-esteem. It has also
been a driving force for Chinese to work hard and achieve perfection.
Since the late Qing period, foreign invasions and consequent humiliations, economic crisis
and collapse of the nation became an unbearable reality to many Chinese. The self-esteem
of many individuals and the nation were in crisis. The extraordinary negative feeling in
China toward this part of history can be attributed to a highly collective Chinese culture. In
a collective culture, the nature of the self is fluid, embedded, interdependent, situated and
particularistic (Heine, 2001; Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi, & Yoon, 1994). Their self-
esteem is more likely to be interdependent (Sinha, Willson & Warson, 2000). When China
as a nation was in crisis, many individuals’ self-esteem, which was closely linked to and
partially dependent on the prestige of the nation, was also badly damaged. To maintain a
feeling of self-worth and control, nationalism was on the rise amongst many Chinese, espe-
cially the educated (Jiang, in press). It is in this historical and cultural context that China
staged four attempts of military modernisation. The motivation for the modernisation of the
Chinese military has always been high and predominantly based on nationalism and a need
for self-esteem.
The first two modernisation attempts aimed to save the nation from being divided up by
Western powers. However, China’s finances were depleted by many years of internal conflicts,
foreign invasions and paying large indemnities. The modernisation movement made some
progress yet not enough to defend the country. Foreign invasions, wars and conflicts contin-
202
THE GLOBAL STUDIES JOURNAL
ued. Globalisation for the Chinese during those periods was much more bitter than sweet
experiences.
The third modernisation attempt was motivated by the Korean War with a realisation of
the potential vulnerable Chinese position in the face of American led UN forces as enemies.
The threat to China was again quite real. To avoid history repeating itself, Communist China
had no choice but to modernise its military. International support from the Soviet Union was
the key for this modernisation. China gained much more success in its military modernisation
as a result of both global threats and support from the Soviet Union.
The last attempt of modernisation has also been motivated by perceived international
threats to China – the US military might and the Taiwanese independence movement. Inde-
pendence to the West is a positive term that derived from individualist cultures. It indicates
self autonomy and freedom. However, to collectivism orientated mainland Chinese, it is
very negative phrase signifying separation and loss that remind them of the pain of contem-
porary Chinese history. The West’s view is that China’s military build up has progressed at
an alarming rate and consequently feels threatened. Western feelings of insecurity are accen-
tuated due to China’s ever expanding strong economy which can finance the current mod-
ernisation. However, it is estimated that China’s military spending has remained constant at
approximately 8 percent over the past 15 years and is not favouring defence spending over
other government priorities such as education (Fravel, 2008). Nevertheless, with the growth
of GDP and government income and expenditure each year, the growing economy becomes
the engine of military modernisation. This was not the case in the earlier three modernisation
attempts. The core objective of the last modernisation is to protect the unity of China. It
would appear that China will stop Taiwan’s independence at all cost, not for the sake eco-
nomic benefit but for national unity and national self-esteem. China is determined not to
have a repeat of history.
Challenges in China’s Military Modernisation
Although China’s military modernisation has transformed the landscape of PLA, many
challenges still exist. The majority of PLA soldiers come from rural China where basic
education is inadequate. China has invested heavily in its military education system, raised
salaries, tightened recruitment standards and introduced new measures to attract and retain
technology savvy talent for the military (Sloan, 2008). However, it will take considerable
time to make the changes required to meet the challenges in a high-tech war, given university
educated youth in China is only a very small percentage of the population when compared
to the USA and other Western countries. Most educated young Chinese do not see a career
in the military as their preferred future.
Currently China has only limited capability to produce advanced military equipment.
Russia and the US see China as a rival: they do not sell nor allow their allies to sell advanced
weaponries to China. Perhaps due to an education system that does not encourage innovation
and independent thinking, the Chinese have been more competent in copying, but less capable
in innovation.
Further, the West has long been concerned about transparency with regard to China’s
military including its budget, weaponry, equipment, training and so on. China has had some
exchanges with the US military allowing greater PLA access to the US side. During these
exchanges China has learned more about US capabilities without much reciprocation. This
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has caused considerable disappointment in America and resulted in reduced US and PLA
exchanges. It is also one of the main reasons for the tight control in transferring US and
Russian military technology to China (Fisher, 2008). However, according to Chinese culture,
transparency is not recommended, especially in warfare. Sun Zi, the ancient Chinese military
strategist, promoted secrecy as a “force multiplier” (Fisher, 2008). In 1989 Deng Xiaoping
also outlined his key principles for foreign policy, including “observe developments… hide
our capacities, bide our time, remain free of ambition and never claim leadership” (Zhang,
Y. 2009, p.74). However, with the West’s growing concern regarding China’s military
modernisation, a lack of transparency would only confirm worst-case assumptions about
China’s ambition (Fravel, 2008). Nevertheless, China will not increase transparency anytime
soon because of the Taiwan issue. It will not reveal the real capabilities of Chinese military
in relation to the mission of China’s unification of Taiwan.
Conclusion
Under the impact of globalisation, China has experienced four attempts at military modern-
isation. Each attempt was motivated by threats to China and the desire to defend its national
interest and self-esteem. Globalisation has also brought great benefits to China enabling the
country to embark on the most recent ambitious military modernisation. However, it should
be acknowledged that consistent with the three previous attempts, this modernisation is more
oriented to defending national interests and self-esteem. Although the rapid military trans-
formation has alarmed or threatened the West, in reality China’s intentions are more about
self-defence and nullifying independence movements in China, in particular Taiwan, and
has little to do with expansion of territory. China is particularly concerned about a possible
domino effect should Taiwan gain independence given China has 56 ethnic groups, some
of whom may seek real autonomy or independence in the future. This understanding of
Chinese history, culture and mores may serve as a buffer to alleviate Western anxiety and
thus avoid overreaction to Chinese military activities.
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